In July 2026, the State Administration for Market Regulation issued a heavy fine to Ctrip: ordered to stop illegal activities, return the order reserve fund, confiscate illegal gains of 1.658 billion yuan, and impose a fine of 3.521 billion yuan, with a total fine amount reaching 5.179 billion yuan.

This penalty was unprecedented in scale, setting two historical records: the highest penalty ratio was 7.5%, surpassing the previous standards set by Alibaba (4%) and Meituan (3%).

This is the first time in an internet platform antitrust case that the method of "confiscation of illegal gains" has been used (not applied in Alibaba or Meituan cases).

Why did Ctrip receive the "heaviest penalty"? Mainly because its monopolistic behavior is more covert, its methods more technical, and its harm to the industry is systemic.

| Traffic monopoly: Using invisible "soft ropes" to tie down merchants

As the largest online travel platform in China, Ctrip's control over merchants is no longer as crude and forceful as Alibaba and Meituan's forced "choose one out of two" tactics back then, but has evolved into a more covert "traffic manipulation tactic."

1. Traffic Rating: Disobedient Traffic Restrictions

Ctrip has established an internal "listing system" that divides hotels into special license, gold license, and unlicensed hotels. Want to enjoy traffic benefits? The cost is clear:

Premium hotels: Enjoy the highest traffic but must cooperate exclusively with Ctrip.

Gold Hotels: Must promise the "lowest price online" (20 yuan or 5% lower than other platforms).

The cunning part is that these unfair clauses are not written in paper contracts at all, but are delivered verbally by the sales manager. If a hotel dares to list on other platforms or offers prices that don't meet standards, Ctrip will directly downgrade and restrict traffic. Some hotels have reported that once downgraded to unlicensed, they face a "traffic penalty period" lasting 15 days to 1 month, causing business to plummet sharply.

2. Hidden "soft ropes": depriving them of cross-platform operating rights

Many consumers have found that some hotels can only be found on Ctrip, not because they don't want to operate on multiple platforms, but because Ctrip has been tied down by invisible "soft ropes." Ctrip uses its absolute control over traffic distribution rights to coerce merchants to abandon other platforms, which legally constitutes "restricted trading behavior" explicitly prohibited by the Anti-Monopoly Law.

3. Industry Harm: Locking in high-quality resources and stifling competition

这种流量垄断的危害是系统性的。长期来看，优质的酒店资源被死死锁定在携程一家平台上，其他竞争平台根本拿不到好房源，很难与携程抗衡。这不仅大幅提高了行业的进入门槛，还严重阻碍了整个在线旅游市场的健康发展。

｜技术作恶：“调价助手”变“降价刺客”，强抢商家定价权

If traffic monopoly is an invisible "soft control," then tools like Ctrip's "Price Adjustment Assistant" are "hard methods" to openly seize merchants' pricing power.

1. Selling Dog Meat under a Sheep's Head: Called "Smart Price Adjustment," but Actually "Forced Price Reduction"

Ctrip claims that the "Price Adjustment Assistant" can help merchants increase their revenue, but in reality, it is a bona fide "Price Reduction Assistant." The system automatically scans prices from other platforms in the backend, and if it finds a lower price, it will forcibly lower the hotel room rate in the backend without the merchant's consent.

Can't turn it off, can't avoid it: A hotel merchant in Jiangsu once broke down complaining that Ctrip forced him to activate this feature nine times without authorization, and "even if you turn it off, it doesn't work—it keeps running."

Absurd "bargain prices": Some hotels forcibly changed room prices from 480 yuan per night to 130 yuan by the system during holidays. When the merchant contacted Ctrip, the sales manager refused to answer the phone or reply to WeChat, and in the end, the hotel was fined by the platform for "refusing orders."

2. Disguised "blood sucking": If the lowest price is not reached, money is directly taken out of pocket

Even worse, Ctrip uses technical means to disguise commission increases. Some hotels reported that the same room type was sold for 100 yuan on Meituan and 98 yuan on Ctrip. Because it didn't meet Ctrip's requirement of "5% lower than other platforms (i.e., 95 yuan)," Ctrip directly deducted 3 yuan from the hotel's system.

After adding various hidden promotion fees, merchants' overall commission rates can reach over 50%. One homestay owner complained: "A 200 yuan order ended up with only about 80 yuan in the end." ”

3. Did consumers really get a bargain? In fact, it's "low price, low quality"

The "lowest price online" sounds like a benefit to consumers, but in reality, this cost is entirely forced on merchants.

Merchants' profits are exhausted: After profits are squeezed to the extreme, merchants are forced to lower service quality to survive.

Consumers pay: What consumers ultimately get is often not cheap good hotels, but "low-price, low-quality" or even "low-price, poor-quality" services.

4. Legal Characterization: Imposes unreasonable transaction conditions

Ctrip's use of technology to force hotels to offer the "lowest price on the entire internet" seriously deprives merchants of their own pricing power and constitutes the "imposing unreasonable transaction conditions" explicitly prohibited by the Anti-Monopoly Law. This is also the second type of core monopolistic behavior that led to the heavy fines for Ctrip.

|Why did she receive the "harshest penalty"?

The core reason Ctrip set an antitrust penalty record is that it is "large enough and representative," and regulators have shown no tolerance.

Data shows that Ctrip holds a 56% market share in the domestic tourism industry. The larger the scale, the greater the responsibility. When a platform can control the "traffic lifeblood" of millions of hotels nationwide, every "forced price adjustment" or "exclusive cooperation" request causes huge damage to the industry's ecological foundation.

To make offenders truly feel the pain, regulators imposed an unprecedented "three-in-one" heavy fine—"stop the illegal act, confiscate illegal gains, and impose fines." A maximum fine rate of 7.5%, combined with the confiscation of 1.658 billion yuan in illegal gains, not only caused Ctrip to pay a heavy price but also sent a strong signal to the entire platform economy sector: compliant operation is an untouchable bottom line.

Although this heavy blow hit Ctrip, it is a blow to the entire industry. Through this pioneering enforcement action, regulatory authorities have clearly told all platform companies: whether it's a simple "choose one of two" or a covert and complex "technology + ecosystem" complex monopoly, none can escape the sword of antitrust.

JCT's Perspective | From "Traffic Harvesting" to "Value Reshaping"

The Ctrip case achieved a maximum fine rate of 7.5% and confiscated illegal gains for the first time, marking a comprehensive shift in antitrust regulation from "extensive punishment" to "refined, penetrative governance."

The regulators' precise crackdown on covert monopolistic behaviors such as "algorithmic black boxes" and "traffic hegemony" means that platforms' business models of relying on "rule barriers" and "traffic harvesting" for easy profits have completely failed. In the future, compliant operations and win-win ecosystems will become the core valuation anchors for all internet platforms.

机会一：OTA行业格局重塑，利好“多平台运营”的线下实体

随着携程被责令停止违法行为并退还保证金，酒店及民宿商家将彻底夺回“自主定价权”和“跨平台经营权”。这意味着线下住宿业的利润空间将得到修复，行业有望从“恶性价格战”回归“服务与品质竞争”。

On the investment side, it is recommended to focus on offline hotel groups with multi-platform operation capabilities, a focus on service differentiation, and strong brand power. They will directly benefit from fairer traffic distribution mechanisms, achieving substantial profit margin recovery.

Opportunity Two: Seeking new platform opportunities in "compliance transformation."

Under the regulatory guidance of "breaking monopolies and promoting fairness," platforms must transform from "traffic distributors" to "value enablers."

For OTA and internet platform companies, the core competitiveness of the future will no longer be exclusive traffic control, but rather supply chain integration, digital operations, and enhanced user experience.

It is recommended to focus on leading platforms that have taken the lead in completing compliance transformations during antitrust rectification, actively leveraging AI and other technologies to improve overall industry efficiency, and possessing overseas expansion capabilities (global layout). They are expected to achieve long-term valuation premiums through genuine service barriers after the industry ecosystem is purified.